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A debatable, yet seldom debated,   
monopoly on expertise 
he European Commission has claimed that a ‘European public opinion’ 
exists and has therefore scrutinised its mood swings for more than 
thirty years. Well before the Brussels institution created the semi-annual 
survey programme called Eurobarometer (EB) in 1973, Jacque-René Rabier, 
its founding father, inferred a rise of a ‘European political awareness’ and the 
existence of a ‘consensus in favour of European integration’ from the results 
of the very first European-wide polls,1 saw the rise of a ‘European political 
awareness’ and of a ‘consensus in favour of European integration’ (Rabier 
1965: 53 ff.).2 Four decades and six hundred opinion surveys later, this 
prophetic intuition has become an institutional truth. Indeed, the regular 
publication of the EB surveys, and the echo created by them, have since 
largely contributed to naturalising the idea of a European public opinion in 
European political, intellectual and media circles. Furthermore, the extensive 
database that they now constitute has been institutionalised to the point where 
it now prevails as the essential source of information on the state of public 
opinion in Europe, as well as the reiterated statistical evidence of support for 
the Community process by the majority of Europeans. 
T 
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Among the EB’s so-called ‘trend’ questions,3 the one that aims to measure 
support for the EU – ‘Generally speaking, do you think that [your country]’s 
membership of the European Union is: a good thing/a bad thing/neither 
good nor bad’ – invariably elicits a majority of ‘positive’ answers. Over the 
1998–2008 period, more than 52 per cent of respondents on average chose the 
first option. While the (slight) drop of the number of positive answers and the 
latest electoral trials have recently led the writers of EB reports to reconsider 
the enchanted vision of a spontaneous and generalised Europhilia,4 the scores 
obtained by this answer are now held as evidence of Europeans’ approval of 
political Europe. A few weeks after the 2005 referendums, in which both 
French and Dutch voters rejected the constitutional treaty, the heads of state 
and government gave this reminder in the conclusions of the European 
Council: ‘We have noted the outcome of the referendums in France and the 
Netherlands. We consider that these results do not call into question citizens’ 
attachment to the construction of Europe’ (Declaration by the Heads of State 
and Government, European Council, 16–17 June 2005, Brussels, SN 117/05). 
In the aftermath of another less encouraging verdict expressed in the voting 
booths, this official certainty was partly based on the EB’s longitudinal results 
and post-referendum surveys.5 An instrument like the EB, which virtually 
holds a monopoly over the analysis of Europeans’ opinions and so assiduously 
supports both the European integration project and the supranational path 
(both spearheaded by the backing institution) should attract sociological 
curiosity. How is the EB made? Who makes it? According to which methods? 
Which means (material, human, conceptual) are used and which aims 
(institutional, political, ideological) are sought? Does the EB have an influence 
– and if so, what kind – on political, media and scholarly perceptions of 
‘European public opinion’? Surprisingly, a review of the academic literature on 
the topic reveals that there has been very little research attempting to shed 
light on these questions,6 even though the literature on European opinion 
makes systematic and liberal use of EB data (Inglehart and Reif 1991; Bréchon 
and Cautrès 1998). 
In the context of the Concorde research programme, it has occurred to me 
that it would be useful to consider the various processes – manufacturing, 
publication, mediatisation, uses, secondary exploitations – at work in the 
equivalence between EB and European public opinion. The analysis presented 
in this chapter thus explores the instrument’s several dimensions: as a 
Community programme for measuring opinions; as an instrument of political 
governance used within the EU’s institutional game and at the interfaces of 
European decision-making; as a dominant, or even exclusive source of data on 
the Europeans’ attitudes. In order to try to understand the EB’s 
unprecedented dominance (as surveys backed and published by a political 
institution) over the general knowledge of Europeans’ opinions on Europe, I 
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will first analyse the questionnaires and raise some methodological issues. 
Then I will go on to study the ins and outs of the institutionalisation of EB 
results, to understand how a monopolistic and official production of 
‘European public opinion’ has come to prevail. 
 
 (Sociologically) questioning the questionnaire 
To understand the place that the EB now holds, we need to go back to the 
origins of the instrument. This historical analysis, however, is made more 
difficult by the numerous accounts provided by the EB’s founders (Rabier 
1993; Melich 1998), who have shaped a powerful founding mythology, in the 
spirit of a general disourse on the ‘heroic’ early stages of the European 
Community (Dumoulin 2007). Embedded in this etiological discourse, the 
EB’s genesis is short-circuited by an indigenous objectivation of sorts, against 
and with which the process of sociological objectivation has to unfold. The 
sociological deconstruction of the founding mythology requires dissociating 
the study of the EB surveys’ production chain and the analysis of their social 
uses and effects. Hence, in this first part, the focus is on the EB reports, 
considered mainly on the basis of their properties as material objects 
containing indications on methodology (how the questionnaires are conceived, 
how the data are interpreted), survey set-up (how the questionnaire is 
administered), and the rhetoric of evidence (how the data are treated and 
modelled, conclusions) (see Topalov 1999), which specifically concern the 
political opinions collected by the instrument. This will be an internal analysis, 
and thanks to close attention to possible biases – immanent (inherent to the 
analysis of opinions through closed-ended questions), induced (generated by 
the conception and the administration of the questionnaires) and topical ones 
(linked to the specificities of the theme imposed and the public required to 
contribute) – of the EB method, I will endeavour to identify their effects on 
the orientation and dispersion of the data. 
 
Recording pol i t i ca l  opinions on Europe in surveys  
Opinion surveys relying on closed-ended questions entail a number of 
inherent biases, inscribed in the hypothesis on which such an approach is 
based, and which may be reinforced by their practical application (intellectual 
and material conception of the surveys, modes of administration of the 
questionnaire). While I do not wish to stir up the controversy between those 
who use and defend opinion surveys (Cayrol 2000) and those who denounce 
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both their epistemological foundations and their effects (Bourdieu 1993; 
Champagne 1990; Lehingue 2007c), surveys, like any other method of 
empirical observation, should be subjected to scientific discussion. Such a 
discussion starts with the two ‘sociological’ assumptions that condition the 
very existence of opinion surveys: persons asked to respond to a survey have 
an opinion on the theme of the survey that can be recorded, measured and 
classified; their opinions display to the same extent the qualities – sincerity, 
consistency, stability – that justify their interpretation through various 
statistical operations of distribution, aggregation, comparison or cross-study 
with the respondents’ properties (age, gender, level of education, occupation, 
place of residence). The sociological critique of these assumptions is as old as 
the introduction of surveys in democracies (Blondiaux 1994), but has never 
offset the promise of this ‘science of opinion’ that offers the illusion of a 
social cartography of political attitudes and of the predictivity of votes. Yet, we 
cannot dismiss the hypothesis positing that persons who are requested to 
respond by an interviewer do not always have a previously constituted or even 
latent opinion on the questions asked (Converse 1964). In such situations, the 
practice that consists in making the respondents choose between pre-worded 
answers in a closed-ended list and then considering that their compliance with 
the request amounts to an opinion arguably produces opinions that are entirely 
artefactual, ‘by-products’ of the interaction between pollster and pollee 
(Lehingue 2007c: 137). Assigning the status of ‘opinions’ to these data and 
submitting them to extensive statistical treatment can therefore be 
problematic. This ultimately depends on the type of solicitation and the 
modalities of responses offered by the survey. How do EB surveys fare on this 
issue? 
The political questions of European Commission surveys include a wide range 
of demands, such as classifying options, comparatively evaluating predictions, 
engaging in self-assessment or introspection, or choosing a side in political 
controversies. Sometimes the solicitation involves the respondents themselves, 
about a choice they will or would have to make as citizens; sometimes it 
requires that they put themselves in the shoes of leaders facing the imperative 
of hierarchising priorities and launching initiatives. This last type of solicitation 
implies varying levels of realism (depending on the respondent’s social status, 
age, and interest in politics) and complexity (depending on the precision, 
technicality, or lexical specificity of the question), as these questions from the 
EB database show: 
Excerpt 1 (EB 10, 1978) 
Which one of these opinions comes closest to your own on the future elections 
to the European Parliament? 
– It is an event with important consequences which is certain to make Europe 
more politically unified.  
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– It is an unimportant event because the national governments will not be 
bound by the votes in the European Parliament. 
 
 Some of the respondents likely have a pre-existing personal opinion, even if it 
is a confused one, on the election of MEPs with direct universal suffrage. But 
how many among them have asked themselves the question in these terms, or 
based on the alternatives suggested? This issue of the adequation between the 
informational elements given by the pollster and the respondent’s spontaneous 
disposition to express an opinion is also raised when we consider the choices 
of answers offered and both the polarised and precise character of the possible 
answer options. The conception of the question-answers group tends to place 
the respondent in an unusual situation of choice, sometimes even unreal, as it 
is very far from common ways to understand to societal or political problems. 
Hence, the situation cannot be compared to pre-election polls, whose relative 
predictivity has legitimised the validity of all political opinion surveys. The 
reliability of pre-electoral polls increases as the electoral campaign develops,7 as 
the political projects and the competing personalities come into focus, and 
especially as the moment when the voter will effectively have to make a 
personal choice draws nearer.8 But with the exception of rare situations, such 
as the organisation of referendums on the ratification of a constitutional treaty 
or the election of MEPs,9 political Europe is a rather remote subject, even 
foreign to the preoccupations of most social actors. The fictional character of 
the theme and of the method of questioning can only be heightened when the 
respondent is asked to react as if he or she were a policy-maker. 
Excerpt 2 (EB 3, 1975) 
Taking into account the great problems facing your country at this time, which 
of these three ways would you prefer to solve the problems? 
–  National independence  
–  Inter-governmental cooperation  
–  The political unification of Europe with election of a single Parliament 
evolving quickly into a true European Government. 
 
Excerpt 3 (EB 63, 2005) 
From the following list of actions, could you tell me what should be for you, 
the three actions that the European Union should follow in priority? (Max. 3 
answers). (List: Fighting illegal immigration/Asserting the political and 
diplomatic importance of the European Union around the world/etc.)  
 
Aside from the biases I have pointed out (lack of realism of the injunction to 
provide an opinion, shift from expected social roles towards role-playing), this 
type of solicitation directly mobilises a vocabulary and concepts borrowed 
from political or legal analysis. Yet, only part of the population uses schemes 
of conceptualisation of political subjects that directly refer to explicitly political 
categories of understanding and judgement. Indeed, the propensity to have 
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recourse to ‘political principles’ (Bourdieu 1984) to judge political questions is 
distributed neither equally nor randomly in society. It is correlated with the 
level of education, social status and occupation. Individuals who are weakly 
politicised and have little educational capital tend to rely on ‘ethical principles’ 
to produce their political opinions, in the sense that they refer more to 
‘common sense’ and domestic morality (Bourdieu 1984). EB questions, which 
are built around an explicitly political terminology and theme, therefore run 
the risk of confronting respondents with an unrealistic request which hinders 
the sincerity, the consistency and the stability of their answers. There are 
significant chances that some respondents will only make a choice in order not 
to lose face and not to break the fleeting ‘pact of the survey’ that links them to 
the pollster,10 not to mention the many risks of misunderstandings between the 
question as it was conceived and worded by the pollsters and as it is 
understood by the pollees (Gaxie 1990). The degree of misunderstanding of 
the questions – and of their specifically political implications – and the feeling 
of incompetence that respondents may experience facing such solicitations 
cause biases that are all the more significant as Europe is generally perceived as 
a remote and complex topic. 
 
Generat ing and interpre t ing opinions on Europe :   
the Eurobarometer ’ s  induced and topica l  b iases  
To a large extent, the EB’s credit derives from the rigour and the scientific 
apparatus of its methodology. Since the programme was launched, the 
Commission has added ‘technical specifications’ to the reports, where the 
survey methods and conditions are briefly outlined (institutes in charge of 
administering the questionnaire, number of respondents per country, etc.) The 
instrument’s reliability and objectivity are asserted through the ostensible 
compliance with the canons of scientificity: the method is openly exposed; 
guarantees are provided on the independence and competence of the authors 
and of the subcontractors; and in a more recent development, the margins of 
error of the results are also made explicit: 
Excerpt 4 (EB 62, 2004)11 
In all countries, gender, age, region and size of locality were introduced in the 
iteration procedure. [The process of ‘weighting’ for the calculation of EU 
averages is explained.] Readers are reminded that survey results are estimations, 
the accuracy of which, everything being equal, rests upon the sample size and 
upon the observed percentage. With samples of about 1,000 interviews, the real 
percentages vary within the following confidence limits: 
 
Observed percentages  10% or 90%  20% or 80%  30% or 70%  40% or 60% 50%  
Confidence limits  ± 1.9 pts  ± 2.5 pts  ± 2.7 pts ± 3.0 pts ± 3.1 pts  
 7 
 
These explicit signs of scientificity can be interpreted by readers of EB reports 
as tokens of ‘scientific’ credibility,12 and attest to the validity of the data and of 
their analysis. But beyond the ostensible compliance with statistical rigour, the 
EB survey system has biases related to the processes used to generate answers 
and to interpret data. The first bias classically concerns the intelligibility of the 
questions. Indeed, as Madeleine Grawitz pointed out, opinion polls ‘obviously 
depend closely on the interviewees’ answer possibilities’ (Grawitz 2001). 
‘Answer possibilities’, however, can be understood in at least two ways: first, 
as the latitude granted to the respondent by the degree of orientation (or 
polarisation) and the more or less limited number of answers. Then, as the 
comprehensibility of the question-answers groups, which hinges on the 
wording (clarity of the formulation and of the terms) and on the social 
significations of their content (readability of the individual and/or collective 
stakes raised by the question). The problem of the latitude of possible answers 
leads us to study its potential effects on the distribution and therefore on the 
structure of the results, which is crucial in statistical interpretation. The 
problem of the ambivalence of significations, on the other hand, suggests 
evaluating the social range of the intelligibility of the problems raised by the 
questions, and therefore questioning the nature of the responses obtained. 
Before I delve deeper into these issues with EB surveys, I want to briefly 
discuss the distinction – in terms of method and effects of the method – 
between opinion polls on politics and polls on everyday behaviours (habits, 
material or symbolic consumer practices, education, etc.), on the perception of 
public objects (image of a public figure, a party, popularity of a brand or 
institution) or social problems which the respondents feel personally concern 
them (purchasing power, security, etc.). EB surveys combine these different 
categories, but here their affiliation with the first category will be considered. 
In principle, political opinion polls do not differ from others in any way: they 
collect, classify, compare judgements, attitudes and subjective perceptions 
according to a method that precisely aims to calibrate and normalise these 
subjective opinions – hence, to deprive them of their personal, singular 
character – in order to be able to code them and statistically process them. 
This depersonalisation is the price to pay for the comparability of the data 
collected. In order to achieve it, questionnaires often exert a certain degree of 
symbolic violence on the respondents, through the overly academic character 
of their questions (technical vocabulary, politicised questions) and the extreme 
standardisation of the answers offered (polarised and limited choices). Then, 
by imposing such solicitations, in strictly identical terms, to respondents who 
are unequally endowed with the competence to express opinions on political 
subjects, this type of survey is ultimately more likely to measure (with an 
inappropriate tool) the interviewees’ level of political literacy13 than to find out 
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how their points of view on the question asked are constructed and why they 
are expressed. In the methodology of opinion polls, this bias is inevitable (due 
to the requirement for comparable data), but it can be kept in check by 
wording question-answers groups less technically or emphatically, by 
introducing open-ended questions or by giving the possibility to give so-called 
spontaneous answers, so that the principle of uniformisation does not cause a 
laminating effect (opinions are crushed and silenced) or a ventriloquism effect 
(the opinions collected are purely artefactual). In this case, it depends on the 
level of political formalism of the instructions given to respondents. Do EB 
surveys capture the way the respondents perceive the issues and challenges of 
the EU, or do they inadequately measure their level of European literacy? The 
following excerpt provides some elements to answer this question. 
Excerpt 5 (EB 42, 1995) 
For some time there has been talk of a ‘Two speed Europe’. This means that 
some countries would be ready to intensify the development of a common 
European policy in certain important areas, while other countries would not. 
Please tell me, for each of the following countries, whether or not you see it as 
being ready to intensify the development of a common European policy in 
certain important areas. [List of Member States] 
 
This question, which I have picked among many similar ones, attests to the 
explicitly political character of EB questions. Admittedly, the phrase ‘Two 
speed Europe’ is explained somewhat didactically to the respondents.14 Yet, in 
order to be able to formulate informed answers to such questions – i.e. being 
aware of the political issues involved and being able to take a stance on that 
basis – respondents require a pre-existing knowledge of the problems raised by 
the institutional situations mentioned and a structured vision on the alternative 
positions or solutions available in the debate. Overall, on such a political 
question, the likelihood of collecting an actual opinion depends not only on 
the comprehension of the question’s terms and concepts, but also on the 
knowledge of European institutional mechanisms (here, the Member States 
and their respective stances vis-à-vis Community integration). Hence, 
simplifying the wording does not fully solve the problem of the intelligibility 
of the question-answers groups.15 Indeed, with such questions, the problem of 
intelligibility is twofold; it is both linked to the specifically political nature of 
the issue raised and to the somewhat esoteric character of European political 
affairs. In addition to the bias induced by the means used to generate 
‘opinions’ (politicisation of political questions), there is another topical bias 
linked to the material, cognitive, and symbolic distance that generally separates 
respondents from EU realities, as the few studies relying on qualitative 
material show (Bélot 2000). Reasons that can explain this confused 
relationship towards Europe include the feeling of geographic and ‘affective’ 
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distance from Brussels, the originality and the impersonal character of the 
mechanisms of EU decision-making, and its changing borders. This confusion 
manifests itself through the interviewees’ difficulty to assign specific 
responsibilities to the EU in terms of public action. 
Questions that are explicitly about the EU and its functioning are perceived 
almost as academic tests of knowledge for which the interviewees almost 
always feel insufficiently qualified. This dimension of the relationship to 
political Europe is confirmed by the results of qualitative surveys financed by 
the European Commission in the past few years. These studies have relied on 
focus groups, and their results very clearly contradict the opinion trends 
traditionally observed by the EB. 
 
Excerpt 6 (Qualitative EB, The European Citizens and the Future of Europe, May 
2006) 
[There are] admission[s] of ignorance of the process perceived as complex and 
difficult to understand. Judgements requested from respondents on the 
functioning of the Union are therefore very rarely backed up by known facts. 
Participants from several groups for that matter state right away that they are 
unable to voice a well-founded opinion. Without having much clearer views, 
respondents from numerous other groups have rather negative impressions, 
with the concept of complexity, opaqueness, slowness of processes or low 
efficiency... 
 
As they give interviewees more opportunities to express themselves, these 
qualitative studies collect opinions that are rather different from those 
generated by closed-ended questionnaires and highlight the feeling of lack of 
knowledge on European institutions. The quizzes included in EB 
questionnaires in the past few years have actually confirmed this point: 
 
Excerpt 7 (EB 67, 2007) 
For each of the following statements about the European Union could you 
please tell me whether you think it is true or false? [EU answers] 
 
For the authors of the EB surveys, these responses work as indicators of the 
respondents’ ‘objective knowledge’ (or ‘actual knowledge’). Despite the shaky 
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logic of the testing system,16 this ‘quiz’ shows the high rate of incorrect 
answers and the very high rate of ‘Don’t Know’ answers to questions on basic 
institutional mechanisms. For several years, the EB questionnaire has also 
included a solicitation for a self-assessment of the interviewee’s knowledge on 
the EU, which is taken as an indicator of ‘subjective knowledge’. 
Excerpt 8 (EB 63, 2005) 
Using this scale, how much do you feel you know about the European Union, 
its policies, its institutions? (Scale from 1 (know nothing) to 10 (know a great 
deal)) Results [EU]: Know (almost) nothing (1–2): 19%/Know a bit (3–5): 
51%/ Know quite a bit (6–8): 27%/Know a great deal (9–10): 2%. The average 
level of subjective knowledge of European Union citizens is 4.5. 
 
These results are also debatable17 but the general tendency of the answers 
(stable for a decade) confirms a widely shared feeling of lack of knowledge on 
how the EU works. Several types of results converge on this point, which calls 
into question the actual properties of the EB data. When 70 per cent18 of 
respondents say that they only know ‘a bit’ or ‘nothing’ about the EU, 
questioning the sincerity and the consistency of their responses to the 
remaining solicitations of the questionnaire is not illegitimate. 
The internal analysis of the EB instrument thus shows that the conception of 
political questions introduces various biases. The lack of realism of the 
solicitations, the politicisation of the questions, the socio-centred character of 
the instructions (which follow the conceptualisation and the vocabulary used 
by the pollsters and those who commission the polls), and, lastly, the social 
resonance of the European object produces raw data whose sociologically 
debatable character cannot be overshadowed by the sophistication or the 
rigour of the statistical treatment applied in primary and secondary analyses.19 
The analysis of opinions on Europe does require recourse to quantitative 
methods for an initial outline – making out general trends, regularities, 
identifying paradoxes – before going into more in-depth sociological 
investigation (zalc and Lemercier 2008). But both the promoters and exegetes 
of EB data grant them much more value than merely providing an overview 
on relationships towards Europe. Displaying a genuine instrumental positivism 
(Bryant 1985), they view it, or feign to view it, as the numerical expression of 






The monopolistic market 
of European polls 
 
While opinions on Europe exist independently from the polling instrument 
that records them and may constitute a European public opinion (henceforth 
EPO), the latter is first and foremost comprised of what the EB measure, to 
paraphrase George Gallup’s famous assertion. Apart from a moving and 
composite phenomenon investigated by sociologists and philosophers (Ferry 
2006), the EPO appears as a social and political reality mostly in the form of a 
normalised designation of a statistical assembly of attitudes recorded through 
polling. In this perspective, it can be seen as the ‘product of a conventional 
process’ that manufactures shared attitudes through extrinsic equivalences20 
and therefore provides European leaders with a concrete reality which can be 
used in their interactions (Desrosières 1993: 7). Indeed, for more than thirty 
years, the EB has performed a double process of substantialisation and pre-
emption over the EPO. The very first EB-labelled survey presents the 
programme as a means to ‘follow the trends in European public opinion with 
regards to Community activities, particularly the areas of most interest to the 
public’ (EB 1, 1974, my emphasis). The idea of a EPO is now so naturalised 
that nobody even seems to think about debating whether it has any 
foundation. Based exclusively on EB results, academics claim that ‘Europeans 
support the Europeanisation of public power because they doubt the skills of 
their State in the context of globalisation’ (Reynié 2008: 11), or that ‘the fact 
that more than half of Europeans express some form of identification with 
Europe, even if usually secondary to the national or regional identifications, is 
indicative of a proto-Europe- an society layered over national and subnational 
societies’ (Diez Medrano 2008). Opinions collected by sample and interpreted 
by the EB commands so much credit that nothing, even actual elections, 
seems to be liable to challenge it. While, sociologically speaking, it is difficult 
to claim that the EPO is – or is not – what the EB polls measure, the EB-
EPO equivalence is considered as self-evident and never called into question 
by the principal users of the Commission’s surveys. The instrument gives form 
and intention to the EPO and, in so doing, proves to be very useful to all 
actors interested in the Europeans’ attitudes and opinions, including political 
leaders, specialised journalists and scholars. The transformations undergone by 
the EB programme since its inception reflect the instrument’s progressive 
instrumentalisation quite well. 
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From an exper imental  f e edback too l . . .  
On the market of trans-European polls, the EB holds a seldom challenged 
monopoly position, the only exception being the four waves of the European 
Values Survey over the last thirty years: 1981, 1990, 1999, 2008. This position 
is maintained by a powerful institution (the European Commission), which 
funds, orders, controls and regularly publishes a state of opinion of which it is 
both the guarantor and the driving force. The first reason for this situation, of 
course, lies in the difficulty and in the means required to simultaneously 
collect, analyse and compare opinions of twenty-seven national populations. 
By publishing EB reports and then making them available online free of 
charge, the European Commission has managed to turn its polling programme 
into an ideal database for students, journalists or researchers working on the 
subject.21 In Europe’s current institutional configuration as in less democratic 
regimes (Rowell 2005), the fact that only politicians are in charge of 
measurement instruments that allow the definition and handling of a ‘social 
reality’ is problematic, especially when said instruments explicitly borrow from 
science their supposedly apolitical truth in order to make their analysis of that 
reality indisputable.22 Since its inception in 1958, the European Commission 
has progressively come to rely on increasingly sophisticated tools of 
management of the public space and opinion, justified through the imperative 
of counteracting its deficit in popularity and legitimacy, pointed out by 
observers (Marquand 1979) and MEPs beginning in the late 1970s. The EB, 
created in 1973, has played an increasingly important role in this 
instrumentation and, like all tools of government, has experienced and been 
transformed by the tensions, priorities and beliefs of the institutional actors in 
charge of it. 
The development of a semi-annual polling programme backed by the 
Commission was initially conceived as a ‘feedback tool’ allowing European 
decision-makers to be informed on the state of opinion on Europe through 
regular and longitudinal opinion surveys conducted in all Member States.23 In a 
Community born from diplomatic negotiations, built on technocratic 
processes, with support from national parliaments but no popular consent, 
this was a way to get a feel for the attitude and the support of European 
populations towards the integration process, in the absence of electoral 
consultations and recognised opinion brokers. The EB’s early stages were 
tentative and the success of the endeavour was uncertain. It was initially a 
marginal, even precarious experiment: not only is this shown by the status of 
its founder Jacques-René Rabier,24 but also by the lack of institutional 
resources (an office and a secretary) and the amateurism of the first EB 
reports. The first eleven reports were introduced as ‘Working document for 
the Commission of the European Communities’; they were typewritten, with 
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many typos and incorrect table borders. Conducted by the French polling 
institute IFOP using the quota method, these polls are retrospectively striking 
in terms of their freedom in the wording of the questions, their analysis, the 
inventiveness of the indicators and the scientific reflexivity on display. For 
instance, the following remarks were made on the possible methodological 
effects related to the very principle of soliciting an opinion on whether more 
or less Europe was needed: 
Excerpt 9 (EB 1, 1974) 
There are two possible explanations for the fact that what the Commission is 
doing is now considered insufficient and it is difficult to choose between the 
two at the stage reached in the analysis. This critical reply may be a stereotype 
by which the public expresses its feeling that ‘the Government never does 
enough’. 
 
While they may seem entirely justified, these considerations on the effects of 
the method of questioning – and their tendency to artificially manufacture 
favourable opinions towards Europe – progressively disappeared.25 Likewise, 
the first EBs included questions whose theme and wording soon came to be 
perceived as ‘unnecessarily controversial’.26 
Excerpt 10 (EB 3, 1975) 
If you were to be told tomorrow that the Common Market was to be scrapped, 
would you feel: Very sorry/indifferent/Relieved/Don’t know? 
 
Excerpt 11 (EB 6, 1976 and EB 21, 1984) 
This is a list of the countries belonging to the European Community (Common 
Market). (Show CARD). Among these countries of the European Community, 
are there any, including your own, you would prefer not to be in the 
community? Which ones? (Followed by a list of the ten member countries) 
 
Excerpt 12 (EB 3, 1975) 
Would you, or would you not, be willing to make some personal sacrifice -for 
example- pay a little more taxes to help bring about the unification of Europe? 
Very willing/Fairly willing/Not very willing/Not at all willing/No reply. 
Results [EC]: Very willing 5%, Fairly willing 21%, Not very willing 24%, Not at 
all willing 43%, No reply 7%. 
 
The greater publicity and media visibility of the results led to a transformation 
of the EB reports, both in form and content. With regard to form, in the 
1990s, the reports as material and then virtual objects (on the Internet) 
resembled products delivered by marketing and polling institutes to their 
customers: they were printed in colour on glossy paper, with a recognisable 
graphic charter and layout, and the main results were projected onto maps, 
etc.27 In terms of content, results were now presented as sound, and doubts or 
scientific discussions on possible invalidating points were no longer 
mentioned. The questions likely to reveal or feed tensions between Member 
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States were removed. Beyond the directness, even the brutality of their 
wording, the questions on scrapping the Common Market and personal 
sacrifice were also progressively removed because their results contradicted the 
fundamental measure of support for the EU. The latter is traditionally in the 
majority among respondents, even though only one out four respondents is 
very or fairly willing to accept sacrifices for the unification of Europe. Faced 
with the perspective of ‘scrapping’ the Common Market, more than a third of 
respondents chose ‘indifference’, and a sizeable proportion (13 per cent in 
1975) went for ‘relieved’. The desire of being part of Europe is contradicted by 
the ‘indicator of tension’: many German (33 per cent), Luxembourgian (38 per 
cent) and French (41 per cent) respondents preferred Great Britain to be out 
of the Community; 47 per cent of Danish and 28 per cent of British 
respondents excluded their own country (EB 21, 1984). 
As the years passed, even though respondents mostly feel incompetent, 
indifferent,28 badly informed and not interested in being informed on 
European politics,29 results favouring unification have been more 
systematically highlighted. Since it proposes a restricted number of responses, 
the EB survey system concentrates and polarises the distribution of responses, 
with remarkable rates for variables that would not otherwise be salient or 
significant. This is the case for the measure of support for unification, trust in 
the European Parliament or the wish to have the EU’s competences extended 
to other fields. In 1975, during an era defined as one of ‘permissive 
consensus’, the distribution of responses to the question ‘All things 
considered, are you in favour of the unification of Europe, against it or 
indifferent’ reveals the respondents’ low level of involvement: 35 per cent 
were ‘very much in favour’, 34 per cent were ‘somewhat in favour’, 15 per cent 
were ‘indifferent’, 5 per cent were ‘somewhat against’, 4 per cent ‘against’ and 
7 per cent ‘Don’t know’ (EC Results, EB 3, 1975). While the official 
interpretation given consists in adding up the first two percentages to claim 
that ‘seven out of ten interviewed (69 per cent) were in favour of the 
unification of Europe’ (ibid.), undetermined (‘indifferent’) responses, ones that 
entail less involvement from the respondent (‘somewhat...’) and negative 
responses add up to 58 per cent of the overall number of respondents, without 
taking into account ‘Don’t know’ answers. Probably for this reason, questions 
were progressively rewritten in more polysemic terms, with less involving 
wordings, and only offering one possibility for an in-between or neutral 
response, thereby reducing the gradation and the dispersion of the results. 
Hence, the politically very sensitive question held as an indicator of support 
for the unification process requires respondents to assess their country’s 
membership of the EU as a good or bad ‘thing’. The removal of the phrase 
‘political unification’ and the undetermined, vague character of the term ‘thing’ 
might contribute to neutralising the politically involving character of the 
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question. Similarly, the reduction of the number of answer possibilities limits 
the fragmentation of the responses, which would emphasise the ambiguity and 
even the fragility of the support expressed. 
Excerpt 13 (EB 70, 2008) 
Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRy)’s membership of the 
European Union is: a good thing/neither good nor bad/a bad thing/don’t 
know? Results [EU]: A good thing 53%, neither good nor bad 27%, a bad thing 
15%, don’t know 5%. 
 
Generally speaking, the strategy of presentation of the results aims at down- 
playing the importance of negative, neutral responses and non-responses. 
Since the 1990s, the results judged by the authors of the reports to be the most 
significant are presented to the reader as map projections and bar charts, 
which never concern marginal values, ‘negative’ results, distant or qualified 
responses (Lehingue 2007c: 54 ff.). Behind this very selective presentation of 
the results, early on, a number of researchers pointed out the relative weakness 
of very favourable opinions towards the EU, and the importance of a form of 
‘benevolent neutrality’ for Europe. (Percheron 1991). The statistically sizeable 
proportion of rates recorded for all low involvement responses is 
sociologically significant: it provides an indication of the social and symbolic 
distance between pollsters and respondents as well as between respondents 
and political Europe. This presentation of the results shows that the feedback 
tool has progressively become an instrument of political expertise, whose data 
are oriented by techniques of generation and valorisation facilitating the 
control of publicisation effects – a well-known and recognised mechanism of 
production of EPO, used both to organise the Union’s ‘governance’ and to 
exhibit European democracy as the Commission’s leaders conceptualise it. 
 
. . .  to  a governance instrument  
The Commission’s official documents now present the EB as a ‘governance’ 
instrument,30 capable of revealing citizen expectations to European decision-
makers. Indeed, it is perceived as a tool to discover the dispositions of 
particular social groups towards Community initiatives, to help make informed 
decisions, to structure the political agenda and to devise communication plans. 
The analysis of the Commission’s official documents on communication 
policy clearly indicates such use of EB surveys by the EU’s institutional 
partners (college of commissioners, the Commission DGs, the Press Service 
of the European Parliament, the Member States’ communication services). 
Before funds of European messages can be developed on major issues, an in- 
depth analysis must be carried out of public opinion in the Member States. The 
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European Commission has the necessary experience and capacity at European 
level to do this. Eurobarometer, and the opinion polls and qualitative studies 
which it draws on, enable it to develop this perception on a consistent and 
regular basis. [...] This cooperation [with Member States] should make it easier to 
meet the expectations and needs of ordinary Europeans more effectively. The 
development of this information monitoring capacity – which could take the 
form of a web-based network linking all the partners involved – will thus provide 
a framework in which to formulate the messages needed for each topic or 
information campaign. 
(European Commission, An information and Communication Strategy for the 
EU, 2002) 
 
As such documents must be made public in Europe, ‘information monitoring’ 
of opinion is presented as a service to citizens. But this rhetorical smokescreen 
hardly conceals the instrument’s political instrumentalisation.31 Since its 
inception, the EB has proved to be an efficient tool to assess political leeway 
for Community action. As early as EB 3 (1975), the attitude of respondents 
towards the possibility of having MEPs elected by direct universal suffrage 
was studied. This question was systematically asked until the effective 
introduction of the reform. The same goes for the introduction of the single 
currency, the European passport, European diplomacy, a European Olympic 
team, but also for the harmonisation of labour laws, of social contributions or 
the idea of European protectionism. The themes of Special EBs and the Flash 
EBs have signposted the transformation of the feedback tool into an 
instrument of political governance most often in the service of the 
Commission’s projects. Keeping in mind that the Commission embodies and 
defends Community interests against national objectives and resistance from 
the States, we may have another perspective on the undoubtedly political role 
of the EB’s publication and mediatisation in institutional power relations, i.e. 
in Commission-Parliament- Council relations. Ostensibly constructed as the 
faithful and objective (and scientific, therefore undebatable) reflection of 
EPO, the EB reports are meant to provide evidence of the social demand for 
‘more Europe’, which can be generated artificially,32 even in unfavourable 
European contexts. Even though they expose European citizens’ confusion 
and lack of knowledge on Europe, qualitative studies are also used to support 
the diagnosis of public support for political integration: a qualitative EB claims 
‘that strong expectations remain towards the European Union can be clearly 
seen when asking the respondents about the Union’s goals and the priority 
objectives which they would set for it’ (The future of Europe, May 2006). The 
EB is also now considered as one of the main resources of the participatory 
turn in European communication, aiming at setting the ‘listening process’ as 
one of the Commission’s new legitimating principles. Since 2001, the 
Commission has claimed it wants to ‘draw more systematically on feedback 
from citizens’ in the conception of European policies. 
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The research function will be the fundamental element of the ‘listening 
process’, through the analysis of Eurobarometer and other survey results, as 
well as media [...] monitoring. 
(European Commission, Action Plan to Improve Communicating Europe, 
2005) 
 
The opinion manufactured by the EBs works both classically as a ‘legitimating 
principle for political discourses and actions’ (Champagne 1990: 42) and as a 
means to assess opportunities and clear paths to develop Community 
initiatives. Some Colleges have used EB more systematically than others. The 
Delors presidency (1985–1995) was a period of intense development and 
exploitation of opinion polls by Commission services, before a relative decline 
during the Santer and Prodi Commissions. Since the introduction of the first 
Barroso Commission (2004), there has been a surge of interest in the EB, 
mainly linked to the overhaul of the EU’s communication policy. After the 
rejection of the constitutional treaty, the White Paper on a European 
Communication Policy (2006) announced the launch of ‘a special series of 
Eurobarometer polls [...] to provide the best possible data for analysis’ and 
went on to explain that: 
In modern democratic societies, policy-makers devote a great deal of attention 
to analysing public opinion, using tools such as opinion polls and media 
monitoring. The importance of these tools has increased in parallel with the 
tendency for citizens to withdraw from traditional politics (joining political 
parties, voting in elections, etc.). European public opinion is complex and 
diverse, reflecting different national perspectives. Understanding it therefore 
poses a particular challenge. The European Commission has been a front 
runner in developing modern tools – such as the Eurobarometer surveys – for 
analysing European public opinion. 
(European Commission, White Paper on a European Communication Policy, 
2006: 10) 
 
In addition to its expertise, the instrument is now also presented by the 
Commission and other institutions33 as an instrument for listening to citizens 
and interacting with them. The ‘State’ polling programme has progressively 
turned into a democratic artifice thought to be capable of bridging the gap 





It does not seem that the scientifically debatable character of EB data on 
political opinions or the instrument’s blatant instrumentalisation are likely to 
slow the dynamic of its extensive and multiple uses. Most discourse and 
studies on opinion trends and European values, after all, very closely depend 
on the data built and published by the Commission (see Chapter 1 in this 
volume). This situation of excessive, sometimes exclusive, dependence on a 
political instrument raises a number of ethical and methodological issues. 
Researchers who conduct secondary analyses of the EB database are generally 
willing to admit its imperfections, but rarely acknowledge its institutional 
origins. Hence, Pierre Bréchon concedes that the EB, like other major 
international surveys (European Values Survey, World Values Survey), 
provides ‘fragile’ data, which ‘are not as refined as qualitative data’, and that 
some of its indicators are ‘in some respects simplistic’ (Bréchon 2002). But he 
argues in the EB’s favour in terms of necessity (the EB, he says, provides 
invaluable and irreplaceable services in furthering scientific knowledge) and, 
especially, scientific rigour (the sophistication of the secondary treatment is 
seen to rectify the data’s genetic biases). Usefulness ultimately prevails over the 
data’s intrinsic weaknesses. Such arguments are rather common among 
consumers of international surveys and tend to neglect the key discussion of 
legitimate scientific objections to their use, for instance on sample 
representativeness34 or the political role of EB results. Similarly, the question 
of whether EPO is an extrinsic reality to the instrument that measures it is 
seldom raised.35 The systematic lack of regard for these issues is likely related 
to the forms of institutionalisation of the instrument which, since its inception, 
has resulted from close and permanent cooperation between Community 
agents schooled in social science,36 specialists of survey research and polling 
institute professionals (Aldrin 2010). Books (Inglehart and Reif 1991; Bréchon 
and Cautrès 1998), workshops and conferences37 on the EB are traditionally 
presented as a publicised moment of this process of coproduction of expertise 
on EPO, to which each category of partners brings their own specific 
legitimacy: institutional and political legitimacy for senior officials and 
commissioners, professional and technical legitimacy for pollsters, and 
scientific and academic legitimacy for researchers. To a large extent, this state 
of affairs explains that the instrument is perceived as an oracle and elicits so 
little critical discussion. 
 19 
Notes  
1. This programme systematised experiments with ‘European polls’ conducted in the 1950s 
and 1960s. ‘Just as a barometer can be used to measure the atmospheric pressure and 
thus to give a short-range weather forecast, this Eurobarometer can be used to observe, 
and to some extent forecast, public attitudes towards the most important current events 
connected directly or indirectly with the development of the European Community and 
the unification of Europe.’ (EB1, 1974). We refer to the EB reports following the 
nomenclature used by the Commission, which assigns them a number based on order of 
publication. When there is no additional precision, ‘EB’ refers to the so-called ‘standard’ 
EBs; when other EBs are discussed (Flash, Special surveys, etc.), this will be mentioned.  
2. This consensus was soon said to be a ‘permissive’ one (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970).  
3. These questions are named ‘trend’ questions because they have been asked since the early 
stages of the programme. 
4. A survey report published in February 2005 claims: ‘We note growing support for the 
European Union membership in the majority of Member States [...]. However, beneath 
this increase lie differences in opinion. In 7 countries, this rise comes hand in hand with 
an increase in respondents regarding membership as a bad thing’ (Special EB 220, wave 
62.2: 7).  
5. According to them, even in countries that voted ‘no’, a large majority of citizens support 
membership in the European Union: 88 per cent of French respondents (Flash EB 171), 
and 82 per cent of Dutch respondents (Flash EB 172).  
6. For an analysis of the EB’s political uses, see Smith 1998. 
7. Especially in national elections, campaigns induce a general upsurge in interest for politics 
(Bennett 1988). 
8. Polling voting intentions amounts to questioning citizens on a choice they will effectively 
have to make, in a role – that of voter – that is familiar and that they acknowledge to be 
theirs. The realism of the solicitation increases near the day of the vote, when the choice 
will inevitably become concrete through one of the following actions: abstain, vote blank 
or vote for a given candidate or party (Berelson et al. 1954).  
9. These elections are characterised by low turnouts and low level of mobilisation during 
campaigns where national political issues prevail (Bélot and Pina 2009).  
10. According to Alain Garrigou, there is a ‘pact of the survey’ (in French, ‘pacte de 
sondage’) whereby ‘the pollee poses and conforms to the duty of opinion’ and ‘pollsters 
first have to reconcile hardly compatible constraints: ask questions that the authors of the 
poll ask themselves to pollees that might not have considered these questions’ (Garrigou 
2006: 47).  
11. Strictly speaking, confidence intervals are only valid within the framework of the 
probabilistic method, i.e. for strictly random samples. Yet, the EB initially worked with 
‘national representative samples drawn up by quota’ (EB 1, 1974), and now relies on a 
sample design with several levels of weighting, presented as a ‘multi-stage, random 
(probability) one’ (EB 69, 2008), but which departs from the probabilistic method. 
12. Arthur Bowley, the inventor of the measure of confidence intervals, ‘has made of 
imprecision, of the margin of error, a respectable, clean object, no longer shamefully 
hidden in the bashful silence of error’ (Desrosières 1993: 275). 
13. The term literacy emphasises the evaluative dimension – testing the level of academic 
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knowledge – of such a set-up (Cheveigné 2004).  
14. Without, however, dissipating the ambiguity of the question: for French respondents, the 
phrase ‘two speed’ has rather negative connotations and is likely to be perceived as a 
metaphor of de facto inequality in the access to certain rights and services.  
15. Such simplification can amount to euphemising or even denying the political 
controversies related to a European issue by offering a depoliticised vision of the issue. 
16. Nothing tells us that the respondents who have chosen the correct answer to the first or 
the third question actually know the accurate answer.  
17. To evaluate their own knowledge of a given subject, interviewees always refer to what 
they think is a sufficient level of knowledge. yet, the respondents also have different 
yardsticks according to their social properties, nationality, or to their country’s date of 
accession to the EU.  
18. This number is obtained by adding up the proportions of respondents who evaluate their 
own knowledge between 1 and 5 (see Excerpt 8).  
19. On the problem of the reliability of data from international surveys see Adam 2008. 
20. Responses to a question on positive or negative feelings towards Europe are taken as 
indicators of support for political unification; those on the modalities of election of 
MEPs as indicators of attachment to European Parliament. 
21. Most of the nearly seven hundred EB surveys (including seventy-one Standard EBs, 231 
Special EBs, 281 Flash EBs and fourteen qualitative studies) are available on the EU’s 
official website (europa.eu). Questionnaires and part of the raw data are available on the 
website of the Mannheimer zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung 
(http://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de) and the Inter-University Consortium for Political 
and Social Research (Ann Arbor, Michigan).  
22. A report from the Bureau of European Political Advisers to the President of the 
Commission, based on EB and Eurostat data, is significantly entitled ‘Europe’s social 
reality’.  
23. MEPs asked for regular trans-Community polls in the February 1972 Schuijt Report. 
24. Formerly Jean Monnet’s Head of Cabinet at the High Authority of the ESCS, he was 
forced in January 1973 to surrender his position as Director-General of the Press and 
Information Service to an Irish official. He was put in charge of the conception of a 
European polling programme as ‘adviser’ (which did not entailed managing an 
administrative service or implementing policy).  
25. However, the questionnaires’ ‘contamination’ effects (Lau et al. 1990) – personalisation or 
politicisation introduced by the enumeration of ‘political’ questions and questions related 
to the social and economic context – remained numerous in the EB after this initial 
period.  
26. According to a senior DG Communication official (interview with the author, May 2007).  
27. This evolution matches the end of the EB’s ‘Stoetzelian’ period; since its inception, it had 
been managed by the IFOP and Faits et Opinions polling institutes. In 1989, INRA, a 
European consortium of opinion research and polling institutes, won the framework 
contract for the Commission’s opinion polls.  
28. The EU is at the bottom of the list of subjects treated in the media to which respondents 
‘pay attention’ (EB 52, 2000).  
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29. A majority of respondents consider that the press (51per cent) and television (50 per 
cent) give ‘sufficient’ and ‘objective coverage’.  
30. The Commission’s White Paper on European Governance (2001), which itself involved 
an EB survey, emphasises continuous polling as a governance instrument.  
31. According to Max Weber, in democracy, more than in other types of government, ‘the 
fact that the chief and his administrative staff often appear formally as servants or agents 
of those they rule, naturally does nothing whatever to disprove the quality of dominance’ 
(Weber 1978). 
32. Not to mention the orientation of questions such as ‘The nine countries of the EEC are 
together dealing with a number of shared problems. Here is a list of them. Could you 
please tell me which one of these problems is the most important at the present time? 
And which is the next most important problem? (EB 1). 
33. See the European Parliament’s report on the period of reflection (A6–0414/2005), 2005.  
34. The random sampling technique relies on the ability of the people drawn at random to 
respond to the pollsters, but members of some segments of the population (single, 
elderly, less-educated, unemployed persons, etc.) more rarely agree to participate in 
surveys (Bon 1991: 193). The reputedly significant proportion and the social profiles of 
those who refuse to participate in EB surveys are never made public or discussed. 
35. Symptomatically, in their insightful synthesis of studies on European opinion, Céline 
Bélot and Bruno Cautrès only mention this in the first footnote: ‘The idea that there is 
such a thing as a ‘European public opinion’ is eminently problematic. [...] Nevertheless, 
since European institutions consider Eurobarometer data to be the expression of a 
European public opinion, and since they take into account their results when they define 
policies, it ensues that European public opinion actually exists’ (Belét and Cautrès 2008: 
153).  
36. Jacques-René Rabier’s successors, Anna Melich and Karlheinz Reif, were academics 
specialised in public opinion.  
37. See the conference ‘35th anniversary of Eurobarometer. Understanding European public 
opinion’, organised in November 2008 by the Commission’s DG Communication 
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